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The idea that not only what but also how financial accounting information is disclosed may 
impact financial evaluation and trading decisions has gained growing empirical support. Yet, 
despite its profound implications for accounting researchers and information users as well as 
policy regulators, we know little about the variables mediating these effects.  
Crucial for both understanding these effects and efficiently designing financial reports is to 
understand the factors that influence the sampling, processing and use of financial information. 
Only then we will be able to shape policy and tailor organizational processes to promote efficient 
use of financial information.  
A rich and biologically rooted understanding of how people make decisions and the factors 
that shape it will require integration of insights and tools from multiple disciplines including 
economics, psychology, computer science and neuroscience.  
The aim of this paper is to review and bridge research from these different fields to address 
the importance of presentation variables in financial decision-making. More generally, the paper 
reviews and discusses the emerging field of ‘neuroaccounting’ and the potential as well as the 
challenges of this multidisciplinary approach to tackle behavioural accounting questions. 
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A ideia de que a avaliação e as decisões financeiras dependem não só do valor real das 
empresas espelhada na informação contida nos relatos financeiros, mas também da forma como a 
mesma é apresentada tem vindo a ser empiricamente demonstrada. Contudo, sabemos ainda muito 
pouco sobre os mecanismos subjacentes ao impacto que o formato tem nos processos de tomada 
de decisão. 
Para compreender melhor o impacto da forma como a informação é apresentada e 
disponibilizada e para conseguir criar relatos financeiros mais eficientes ao nível da transmissão da 
informação desejada, é fundamental perceber os fatores que influenciam a aquisição, o 
processamento e utilização da informação financeira e contabilística. 
O conhecimento dos processos psicológicos e neurais que culminam na tomada de decisões 
e dos fatores que os influenciam requer a integração de abordagens e ferramentas de várias 
disciplinas e áreas do conhecimento, designadamente da economia, da psicologia, das ciências 
computacionais e da neurociência. 
O objetivo deste trabalho é rever e discutir a investigação mais recente nestes diferentes 
campos, em particular a relacionada com a importância da forma de apresentação da informação. 
Pretende-se ainda discutir a abordagem multidisciplinar que começa a emergir sob a designação de 
"neuroacounting", reconhecendo o seu potencial, mas também as suas limitações. 
 
Palavras chave: Tomada de Decisão, Relato Financeiro, Formato de Informação, Psicologia, 











ACC - Anterior cingulate cortex  
AMG - Amygdala 
BOLD  -  Blood-oxygen-level dependent  
DA -  Dopamine  
dCS  -  Direct current stimulation 
dPFC - Dorsal prefrontal cortex 
EEG  - Electroencephalogram 
fMRI  -  Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging  
IGT  -  Iowa Gambling Task  
NA -  Nucleus Accumbens  
OFC - Orbitofrontal cortex 
PET  -   Positron Emission Tomography 
PFC  -  Prefrontal Cortex 
SCR  -  Skin Conductance Response  
ST  -  Striatum 
TMS  -  Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation 
vmPFC  -  Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex 
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Episodes like the financial crisis of 2008 show us that despite its profound social and 
economical implications, we are still far from having a complete understanding of market 
behaviour.  
For a long time, financial theorizing revolved around the idea that behaviour, at the market 
level, is rational or, in the exact words of the most influential theory: efficient. According to the 
efficient market hypothesis (EMH), market prices always incorporate and reflect all the available 
information (Fama, 1970), and thus stock always trades at its fundamental value: the present value 
of its expected future cash flows (Fama, 1970, Barbaries & Thaler, 2003). 
The EMH was widely accepted as an accurate model of financial markets, until, in the 
1980s, empirical studies started questioning its descriptive validity.  Today, there is a large body 
of literature showing instances where markets behave inefficiently: prices vary more than what 
EMH predicts, available information is sometimes not fully or only slowly reflected in prices and 
trading levels are much higher than expected (see Barbaries & Thaler, 2003 for a review).  
Why and how these deviations occur is still not well understood. Efficiency models assume 
that individual “irrationality” reflects idiosyncratic behaviour and is thus irrelevant to aggregate 
market phenomena (Barbaries & Thaler, 2003). However, research from psychology has shown 
that these deviations are pervasive and appear to reflect regularities in how people process 
information and decide (Barbaries & Thaler, 2003; Garling et al., 2009). 
Aware of the importance of psychological factors in understanding both individual and 
market level behaviour, many researchers started incorporating psychology findings into their 
research with the aim of building more accurate models. This led to the emergence of behavioural 
economics, behavioural finance and behavioural accounting, among others (Barbaries & Thaler, 
2003, Garling et al., 2009). However, behavioural data alone, from the field or laboratory 
experiments, is often not enough to distinguish competing psychological theories. Furthermore, it 
offers a limited, only inferential, window into the actual processes behind choice (Frydman et al., 
2014). Neuroscience offers an additional source of data that can prove invaluable in refining, as 
well as distinguishing, different psychological and behavioural theories (Frydman, 2012). 
Neurobiological measures can also provide additional predictive power over subjective reports, 
since much of the processing that goes on in the brain is not available to conscious awareness 
(Chua et al., 2011, Falk et al., 2011, Smith et al., 2014). 
The potential of using neuroscientific data, in additional to choice data, to study economic 
and financial behaviour has been acknowledged by several researchers across the natural and 
social sciences, as shown by the emergence and fast growth of new fields such as neuroeconomics 
and neuromarketing (see e.g. Ariely & Berns, 2010; Frydman et al., 2014; Bossaerts et al., 2009; 
Camerer, 2013; Loewenstein et al., 2008).  
More recently, behavioural accounting researchers have also started looking to apply this 




already recognized and began to discuss the potential of neuroscience in accounting research, work 
bridging the two is still scarse and the little that exists has only touched on a few aspects of 
behavioural accounting e.g. the evolution of accounting principles. In particular, at least to our 
knowledge, there is no work to date applying this approach to the study of financial information 
disclosure format and its influence on decision-making.  
The way information is presented or described has long been recognized in psychology as 
an important factor in decision-making, but it has only recently been considered in the field of 
financial accounting. The idea that not only what but how accounting information is disclosed may 
impact evaluation and trading decisions has gained growing empirical support. Yet, despite its 
profound implications for both accounting researchers and financial information users and 
regulators, we know little about the variables mediating these effects. Crucial for both 
understanding these effects and efficiently designing accounting reports is to understand the 
factors that influence the sampling, processing and use of financial information. Only then we will 
be able to shape policy and tailor organization process to promote efficient use of financial 
information. Reaching this understanding will require the integration of insights and tools from 
different levels of research. This paper aims to bridge research and approaches from behavioural 
accounting, economics, psychology and neuroscience, to explore this particular question. Rather 
than offering an answer, our aim is to bring together pertinent research from the different fields, 
discuss why it is important that this integration materializes and highlight possibilities for future 
multidisciplinary research.  
This review is structured as follows: section 2 provides a brief introduction to the brain and 
neuroscience. Section 3 describes the different approaches taken by economics, psychology and 
neuroscience to the study of decision-making. Section 4 reviews and discusses the work at the 
intersection between these fields: the developments in neuroeconomics and the first steps in the 
emerging field of ‘neuroaccounting’. Section 5 explores this multidisciplinary approach to address 
a specific financial accounting question: why and how is information format important for 
decision-making? We focus first on the processes and variables that are intrinsic to the information 
report itself (independent of a particular decision maker) (5.2.1-3) and then move on to explore 
those related to the internal state of the decision maker, i.e. emotional factors (5.2.4). For 
simplicity, we provide a summary and short discussion at the end of each part. In section 6, we 
expand on this discussion, by first providing an overall synthesis and then discussing more broadly 





2. FUNDAMENTALS OF NEUROSCIENCE 
2.1. Levels of analysis in neuroscience research   
Neuroscience can be broadly defined as being interested in how nervous systems are 
organized and how they function to generate behaviour (Kandel, 2013). These questions can be 
explored at different levels of analysis using appropriate tools. According to the level of analysis, 
neuroscience is usually broadly divided into molecular (interested in the role of different 
molecules for neural function), cellular (cellular organization and function), systems (how 
different neural circuits process and represent information), behavioural (how neural systems 
interact to produce behaviour) and cognitive neuroscience (higher-level functions such as decision 
making and language) (Bears et al., 2007).  
2.2. The nervous system   
Neuroscientists have conventionally separated the vertebrate nervous systems anatomically 
into central and peripheral components. The central nervous system includes the brain and the 
spinal cord. The peripheral nervous system comprises the sensory and motor neurons that link the 
brain with the periphery. 
The nervous system like the rest of the body is made up of cells, the fundamental unit of all 
living organisms. Nerve cells or neurons are specialized cells that are capable of electrical 
signalling over long distances and can communicate with other neurons via specialized sites called 
synapses. Glial cells offer structural and metabolic support to neurons. The human brain is 
estimated to contain around 86 billion neurons and approximately the same number of glial cells 
(Azevedo et al., 2009, Hilgetag & Barbas, 2009). 
Neurons do not function in isolation, but are organized into networks or neural circuits that 
process specific types of information and provide the basis for sensation, perception and behaviour 
(Kandel, 2013). Neural systems can be broadly divided in one of three general functions. Sensory 
systems represent information about that state of the organism and the external environment. 
Motor systems respond to that information by generating behaviour. Finally, associational system 
include most of the cerebral surface of the brain and are broadly responsible for the complex 
processing that goes on between the arrival of input in sensory areas and the generation of 
behaviour in motor areas (Kandel, 2013). 
The central nervous system is usually considered to have seven different parts: the spinal 
cord, medulla, pons, cerebellum, midbrain, diencephalon and cerebral hemispheres. In humans, the 
cerebral hemispheres are proportionally larger than in any other mammal and are usually divided 
into four lobes: occipital, temporal, parietal and frontal lobes (Kandel, 2013, see Appendix I). The 
remaining subdivisions of the forebrain lie beneath the cerebral hemispheres and include the basal 
ganglia, the hippocampus and the amygdala. Other important areas include the thalamus and the 




2.3. Key relevant findings    
One key finding from neuroscience research is that the brain is neither fully specialized nor 
integrated, but has different degrees of specialization. This means that no area can be said to be 
fully responsible for a given function or behaviour. Another key finding is that the brain is plastic, 
that is, it can change according to experience. Plasticity is most obvious in childhood but continues 
into adolescence and adulthood, with evidence that adults are also able to adapt to change and 
recover from injury (Camerer, 2007). Another important discovery is that contrary to traditional 
expectations, attention and conscious are actually rare (Camerer, Loewestein & Prelec, 2005), with 
much of the processing taking place outside awareness. This means that often we may have little 
introspective access to the underlying determinants of our behaviour. Finally, evolution 
conservation is the main reason why animal studies are so helpful in providing us information 
about human brain and behaviour. Humans share a significant amount of brain structure and 
function with non-human animals (Kalenscher & van Wingerden, 2011).  
3. MULTIPLE APPROACHES TO DECISION-MAKING 
Human decision-making has attracted attention from a variety of different fields including 
economics, psychology and neuroscience. Pursuing different goals, these areas have used different 
approaches that offer a unique, but complementary, perspective on decision-making. 
3.1. Economics and Finance  
The birth of neoclassical economics is often traced to 1930s, when a group of economist 
began to define a new, mathematically-rooted, approach to the study of choice behaviour 
(Glimcher & Fehr, 2014, Caplin & Glimcher, 2014).  
At the core of the Revealed Preference Approach (Samuelson, 1938), as it became known, is 
the idea that economic models should be rooted not on psychological constructs, assumed a priori 
to predict choice, but on a set of simple mathematical principles, or axioms, that make clear 
behavioural predictions and can be rigorously tested (Glimcher & Fehr, 2014). 
Thus, according to this view, economists should be concerned not with explaining how 
choices actually happen, but simply with whether they can be represented by a certain 
mathematical function. For instance, a decision maker’s choices can be represented by the 
maximization of some utility function, if they obey a set of simple principles that can be 
mathematically shown to be necessary and sufficient for that representation to be valid. Such 
simple principles include the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP; Samuelson, 1938) and 
the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP; Houthakker, 1950). The former states that 
individuals must have a stable rank order preference, that is, if a decision maker chooses A over B 
in one situations, then he should never choose B over A in another situations when both options 
are available. The later just means that individual choices must be transitive: if the subject prefers 




In this framework, psychological “hidden” variables are irrelevant, as long as the decision-
maker obeys these set of principles, he (she) can be assumed to behave “as if” they had an utility 
function and “as if” their choices sought to maximized it. In this way, his (her) choices can be 
modelled and predicted (Glimcher & Fehr, 2014; Caplin & Glimcher, 2014).  
The revealed preference approach has been profoundly influential in economics and formed 
the basis of many subsequent models that, by adding additional axioms, extended the framework 
to various decision contexts including when outcomes are uncertain (standard and expected utility 
theories), delayed in time (discounted utility) or result from interactions between players (game 
theory) (Glimcher & Fehr, 2014). In all of them, decision-makers are assumed to maximize some 
utility function, what varies is the details of that function. It is important to note that although 
neoclassical economics continues to use words like preference or utility, which in earlier economic 
theorizing were connoted with abstract, psychological meaning, in this approach they are merely 
used as a mathematical tool, a convenient re-description of choice (Glimcher & Fehr, 2014).  
Perhaps the most well known utility-based theory is the Expected Utility Theory (EUT, Von 
Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944, as cited in Glimcher & Fehr, 2014). According to EUT, decision 
makers when faced with a choice between options that have uncertain outcomes (and their 
probabilities are known) decide by computing the expected utility of each option - its utility 
multiplied by the probability of it actually occurring - and selecting the option with the highest 
value. 
Utility-based theories and similar normative approaches have also been profoundly 
influential in financial theorizing. The traditional financial approach to market behaviour also 
relies on normative theories assuming that prices are set by normatively rational (Bayesian) agents 
that update their beliefs optimally given the available information and that, given those beliefs, 
make choices according to expected utility models (Barberies & Thaler, 2003).  
Although the efficient market hypothesis (Fama, 1970) does not require that all market 
participants are rational, it assumes that rational agents are at least sufficiently well represented to 
guarantee that any inefficiencies caused by irrational trader activity are always fully and quickly 
eliminated and that prices always revert back to their fundamental value (Friedman, 1953, as cited 
in Barbaries & Thaler, 2003).  
3.2. Psychology and Behavioural Economics  
The axiomatic approach has been successful in modelling and predicting both consumer and 
market behaviour across a variety of contexts, however it has become increasingly clear that it is 
not sufficient to capture much of individual and market behaviour. In fact, a large body of 
empirical research has shown that decision-makers and markets often deviate from neoclassical 
assumptions (Libby et al. 2002, Barbaries & Thaler, 2003). For example, Kahneman & Tversky 
showed that contrary to what rational choice theory would predict, people are remarkably sensitive 




showed that depending on whether the options were framed to emphasise the gains or to 
emphasise the losses, people’s preferences radically changed (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). This 
effect became known as the “Framing effect” and has since been replicated across a variety of 
different contexts.  
At the market level, several studies have reported market inefficiencies that came to 
challenge standard market theory.  The excessive volume of trading observed in stock markets and 
the large variability (‘volatility’) in prices are only two examples (Libby et al., 2002, Barbaries & 
Thaler, 2003; see Fama et al., 1998 for a contrary perspective). 
Why these deviations happen is still an open question and at the core of much of current 
research in the fields of behavioural economics and finance. One key finding of this line of 
research is that most of these deviations are not simply idiosyncratic behaviour but very systematic 
tendencies (Libby et al., 2002, Barbaries & Thaler, 2003). This suggests that they may reflect 
regularities in the way we acquire and process information and points research towards examining 
the psychological processes behind choice (Garling et al., 2009).  
Key to this trend was the work of Herbert Simon on bounded rationality (Simon, 1955). 
Simon argued that the notion of maximization was simply not realistic given the findings from 
psychology research. In many situations, the computations that would be required to behave 
according to normative theories are simply not feasible.  Thus, rather than maximizers, decision-
makers, he said, are better described as boundedly rational, that is, as seeking to achieve a good 
enough solution given the various constraints they face (Simon, 1955). Simon’s work highlighted 
the importance of studying the underlying psychological processes to understand how and why 
decision makers decide the way they do, laying the foundation for much of subsequent behavioural 
economic research (Glimcher & Fehr, 2014).  
One way that researchers have used to study psychological processes behind choice is by, 
indirectly, inferring them from choice. Much like cognitive psychologists infer visual processes 
from optical illusions, the heuristics approach aims to examine the “errors” (deviation from 
normative predictions) that decision-makers make across a wide range of decision problems to 
then infer the underlying processes or strategies that generated it (Glimcher and Fehr, 2014). For 
instance, people have been shown to make systematic errors when judging event probabilities. 
Based on these deviations, Tversky and Kahneman suggested that people use the “availability 
heuristics”, that is, they judge the probability of an event based on how easily they can recall 
instances of that event (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973).  
These simple decision rules are thought to be useful but imperfect strategies that allow 
rapid, although sometimes incorrect, decisions in situation that may be impossible or too costly to 
solve normatively. In this case, the problem arises from the fact that “easiness of retrieval” 
depends not only of the frequency of event occurring but also on other “irrelevant” factors such as 




many others since, have described a variety of other systematic “errors” and proposed a number of 
different heuristics to explain them (e.g. Tversky and Kahneman, 1974).   
This approach has been crucial in highlighting the descriptive inadequacy of many 
normative theories and in providing some insight into how decisions are actually made.  However, 
they do not explain why people use them, and exactly when people choose one heuristics over the 
other or why people are sometimes able to correct their answers. More generally, inferring 
psychological processes from behavioural data alone may be difficult since different psychological 
theories often have similar behavioural predictions (Frydman et al., 2014). 
Neural data may offer an additional source of data that can prove invaluable in 
distinguishing psychological theories and in getting closer to the actual determinants of behaviour 
(Frydman et al., 2014, Smith et al., 2014). For this reason, many behavioural researchers have 
become increasingly interested in incorporating neuroscientific techniques and findings in their 
research (Birnberg and Ganguly, 2012).  
3.3. Neuroscience  
In its study of decision-making, neuroscience aims to understand the neural mechanisms 
underlying simple and complex decision. It aims not only to map cognitive and behavioural 
functions to brain circuits but to clarify the general principles of how circuits are organized, what 
computations they perform and how they give rise to function.  
Neuroscientists have used a variety of approaches in both humans and other animals to 
study decision-making. These include assessing deficits after a lesion or brain damage, monitoring 
or manipulating neural activity while subjects perform a decision-making task and using 
computational models to link behavioural and neural data (Glimcher & Fehr, 2014).  
Brain lesions are a crude but useful way to establish a first link between a specific deficit 
and a brain region. For instance, patients with brain damage to the orbitofrontal cortex (see 
Appendix II, also called the ventromedial prefrontal cortex) often display problems with decision-
making in real-life situations. In particular, they appear to overlook the long-term consequences of 
their actions, a phenomenon often referred to as “myopia for the future” (Damásio, 1994).  
A common approach involves correlating direct measurements of brain activity, i.e. 
electrical activity of single neurons, with behavioural events in simple tasks, where inputs (i.e. the 
information the subject receives) can be carefully controlled. For example, monkeys can be trained 
to evaluate an ambiguous visual signal (e.g. moving dots on a screen) that indicates which of two 
responses will lead to reward. By recording activity from neurons in a motion-sensitive part of the 
visual cortex, Newsome and colleagues showed for the first time that the firing rates of single 
neurons could be used to reliably predict the monkeys’ choices (Newsome et al, 1989; Glimcher 
and Fehr, 2014).  
This line of work has been very fruitful not only in advancing our understanding of the 




monkeys and rodents, can perform complex tasks including those involving integration of 
evidence (Shadlen & Newsome, 2001, Hanks et al., 2015), probabilistic reasoning (Kiani & 
Shadlen, 2009), numerical reasoning (Nieder et al. 2002), decision confidence judgements (Kepecs 
et al. 2008), context-dependent decision (Mante et al., 2012), among others (Gomez-Marin & 
Mainen, 2016).  
Recent developments in non-invasive recording methods, such as electroencephalogram 
(EEG), positron emission tomography (PET) and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), 
have opened the possibility of also measuring brain activity (albeit more crudely) in humans while 
they perform cognitive tasks. EEG is the oldest method and measures rapid changes in electrical 
activity using electrodes attached to the scalp (Camerer, Loewenstein & Prelec, 2005). PET 
measures changes in blood flow or glucose metabolism in the brain based on the movement of 
injected radioactive material (Huettel, Song & McCarthy, 2009). Finally, fMRI measures changes 
in blood oxygenation over time; because blood oxygenation levels change following activity of 
neurons, it is used as a proxy for neural activity, allowing researchers to map activity across the 
brain (Huettel, Song & McCarthy, 2009, Logothetis, 2008). Each of these methods has its relative 
strengths and weaknesses. EEG provides high temporal resolution (millisecond scale) and contrary 
to fMRI and PET, it provides a direct measure of neural activity. Another major advantage is its 
portability and relatively low expense. However, EEG has poor spatial resolution and it can only 
measure activity in superficial parts of the brain. PET has better spatial resolution, however it 
requires the use of radioactive tracers, which limits significantly its applicability. fMRI does not 
require the use tracers and can thus be used as many times as needed by the same individual. It has 
the highest spatial resolution out of the three (milimiter scale) and offers intermediate temporal 
resolution (order of seconds). These advantages have made fMRI incresingly popular among 
researchers (Camerer, Loewenstein & Prelec, 2005, Huettel, Song & McCarthy, 2009).  
It is important to note that the currently available non-invasive techniques offer only a crude 
measure of brain activity. Neural events occur in a milisecond scale and in less than 0.1 milimeters 
space, yet the spatial and temporal resolution of a typical fMRI scanner is several mms (thousands 
of neurons) and several seconds. Another aspect to keep in mind is that studies using these 
techniques usually require a comparison between two conditions or tasks performed by the same 
subject. By subtracting the two (an experimental and a control condition), the researcher can get a 
measure of the regions of the brain that are differentially activated by the experimental task. 
Importantly, an obvious implication of this kind of design is that a meaningful interpretation of the 
results crucially depends on an appropriate selection of the control condition, which may not be 
trivial. Despite these limitations, fMRI has reached a high level of sophistications that combined 
with careful experimental designs and analysis methods can still provided rich information on the 
neural correlates of behaviour (Braeutigam, 2012).  
Other, non-neural, physiological measurements, such as heart rate, skin conductance 




arousal), either in isolation or in combination with other techniques. These are perhaps the simpler  
to use and the most portable. The disadvantages are their non-specificity, for example, several 
different emotional states can lead to similar physiological responses. Eye movements can also be 
measured using eye-tracking technology, which is becoming increasingly cheaper and more 
portable.   
Beyond correlational methods (all above except brain lesions), causal links between neural 
activity and behaviour can be tested using manipulation techniques. In animals, researchers can 
use invasive techniques such as electrical or optical activation of different groups of neurons or 
manipulations with pharmacological agents (some also possible in humans). Non-invasive tools 
for manipulating neural activity are also becoming increasingly popular. Transcranial magnetic 
stimulation (TMS) is one example that can be used to temporarily modulate activity in certain 
brain regions (Fehr & Rangel, 2011, Huettel, Song & McCarthy, 2009).  
It is important to emphasize that neural and behavioural understanding evolve hand-in-hand. 
On one hand, understanding neural mechanisms of decision-making, or indeed any behaviour, 
crucially depends on having appropriate behavioural paradigms, that 1) capture the cognitive 
process of interest and 2) are adequate to the constraints, e.g. temporal, of the technique being used 
(LeDoux, 2015, Milner & White, 1987). On the other hand, insights from neural data can help 
better understand the behavioural itself. So one must go back and forward between the 
psychological and neural level: using biology to constraint psychological models and 
psychological theory to guide neural search and interpretation. 
3.4. Bringing together economics, psychology and neuroscience  
Having a biologically based theory of how humans make decision that is useful for both 
natural and social sciences will require the integration of findings and approaches from several 
different disciplines including economics, psychology and neuroscience (Rangel, Camerer & 
Montague, 2008). Economics offers a rich variety of choice paradigms and mathematical models 
of the variables that the brain needs to compute to make decisions. Psychology offers a large body 
of behavioural data on how people and other animals choose under different conditions and 
theories about those processes. Neuroscience offers the knowledge of the brain and the tools to 
study the neural events underlying decision-making processes. A forth discipline whose 
contribution is becoming widely recognized and that is key to bridging these different levels of 
description is computer sciences. Computational models can help identify the signals that are 
required by different decision problems and thus offer a crucial bridge between behavioural and 




4. INTERSECTIONS: NEUROECONOMICS AND NEUROACCOUNTING 
4.1.  Neuroscience in the study of economic choice  
To explore the potential of interdisciplinary research in tackling behavioural accounting 
questions, it is informative to look at how neuroscience findings and tools have been applied in 
other fields such as economics, and how these fields have evolved.  
Neuroeconomics is a relatively recent field that aims to relate formal theories of choice to 
neural measures, to produce a detailed computational and neurobiological account of decision-
making processes (Fehr and Rangel, 2011). It combines methods and theories from neuroscience, 
psychology, economics and computer science to investigate the variables computed by the brain 
when making different types of judgements and choices (Rangel et al., 2008). 
As Glimcher & Fehr (2014) describe it, the field of Neuroeconomics can be divided into 
partially overlapping communities. One that is mostly focused on using fMRI as a tool to test and 
develop alternatives to neoclassical theories, and a second that uses economic theory as a tool to 
test and develop models of the brain mechanisms underlying choice (Glimcher & Fehr, 2014). 
Most of the initial work focused on mapping brain areas that are active when a subject is 
performing a particular cognitive task (Glimcher & Fehr, 2014). However, many of these studies 
relied on reverse inference, a form of resoning that is not deductively valid and that Poldrack 
(2016, p. 59) nicely puts as follows: “(1) In the present study, when task comparison A was 
presented, brain area Z was active. (2) In other studies, when cognitive process X was putatively 
engaged, then brain area Z was active. (3) Thus, the activity of area Z in the present study 
demonstrates engagement of cognitive process X by task comparison A.” This logic would only be 
valid if we knew that brain area Z was active if, and only if, cognitive process X was engaged. 
However this seems to be rarely the case (Poldrack, 2006, 2011, Birnberg & Ganguly, 2012). The 
use of reverse inference can be useful as a starting point and provide some information, however it 
should be used with great care, especially when the selectivity of the brain region is not 
established or is known to be weak (Poldrack et al, 2006). Novel statistical analyses have since 
emerged allowing research to make more useful and careful use of this type of inference. For 
example, bayesian approaches can be used to estimate the likelihood of a cognitive process from a 
pattern of brain activity taking into account not only the number of previous studies that reported 
that activity pattern when using a particular task, but also those that reported the same pattern 
when not employing that type of task (Poldrack et al., 2011).  
Beyond trying to map specific brain areas to cognitive task, the tendency in both 
neuroscience and neuroeconomics has been to develop sophisticated computational approaches 
that careful model the behaviour to then identify areas or networks of areas that, across tasks, 
correlate consistently with the same putative computational process (Braeutigam, 2012, Glimcher 




Recent years have also seen an increase in the number of studies addressing causality, using 
non-invasive techniques such as transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) or direct current 
stimulation (dCS), that allow manipulation of neural activity in specific parts of the brain (Fehr & 
Rangel, 2011). 
Numerous, partly overlapping reviews have appeared describing and discussing this rapidly 
growing field and the more recently emerging subfields of neurofinance and neuromarketing (e.g. 
Ariely & Berns, 2010, Camerer et al., 2005, Frydman et al., 2014; Bossaerts et al., 2009; Camerer, 
2013; Loewenstein et al., 2008). Among the benefits discussed, they highlight the potential of 
neural data to help tease apart psychological theories with similar behavioural predictions; the 
potential of revealing and defining neurobiological constraints that can refine behavioural theories 
(Camerer, Loewenstein & Prelec, 2005), the potential of using observations from neural activity 
patterns to formulate novel behavioural hypotheses and predictions (e.g. if distinct brain activity 
patterns are observed, despite similar behaviour, then it becomes interesting to know what factors 
may be involved). Furthermore, neuroscience can offer objective and independent measures that 
provide a way to validate introspective reports, and of revealing what cannot be accessed 
introspectively (Chua et al., 2011, Falk et al., 2011, Smith et al., 2014). Finally, neuroscience, and 
more specifically, comparative studies of brain and behaviour, can help provide insight into the 
evolutionary roots of economic behaviour (Kalenscher & van Wingerden, 2011). 
It has also received critics. Some neurobiologists are skeptic that neuroimaging techniques 
can provide significant insight into complex behaviours such as decision-making (Birnberg & 
Ganguly, 2012). From the economists side, some have argued that algorithmic level studies of 
decision making just provide finer grain and are unlikely to improve the predictive power of the 
revealed preference approach (Birnberg & Ganguly, 2012, Glimcher & Fehr, 2014). 
Although no approach is free of limitations and indeed progress will dependent on having 
converging data from different techniques and experimental conditions from both animals and 
humans, there seems to be a general recognition of the potential of incorporating neuroscience into 
the study of human decision-making. There have been an exponentially increasing number of 
publications in neuroeconomics as well as growing interest from other areas such as finance, 
marketing and accounting (Braeutigam, 2012).  
4.2. The emergence of neuroaccounting  
Behavioural accounting researchers have also started showing interest in applying 
neuroscience findings and related tools to their research, with a few reviews and research papers 
emerging since 2009 (see Birnberg & Ganguly, 2012), that I will briefly review and discuss in this 
section.  
4.2.1. The potential of neuroscience in accounting  
Accounting has been typically defined as the process of collecting, summarizing and 




Behavioural accounting in particular is interested in studying both individual and aggregate 
behaviour while they carry one or more of these functions (Birnberg & Ganguly, 2012). 
Some authors have started discussing the potential of incorporating neuroscience into 
accounting research (Birnberg & Ganguly, 2012, Dickhaut et al., 2010). There seems to be a 
general recognition that neuroscience can contribute to accounting research by helping to 
understand how people process information and stimuli, how they react to different types of 
information and events including favourable and unfavourable ones, how their behaviour is shaped 
by others and how current accounting practices may have emerged and evolved (Birnberg & 
Ganguly, 2012, Dickhaut et al., 2010).  
4.2.2. First steps in neuroaccounting 	
One of the first to show an interest in incorporating neuroscience into accounting research 
was Dickhaut and colleagues, who hypothesized that the origin and evolution of recordkeeping – 
the most basic of accounting functions – is a consequence of the organization and limitations of 
our brain (Dickhaut et al., 2010). At the core of their hypothesis is the idea that as societies 
became more complex, with a growing number of possible exchange partners, increased diversity 
of food and ability to store it, the brain’s ability to remember all the relevant information was 
challenged, and thus societies turned towards external recordkeeping, as a memory aid (Dickhaut 
et al., 2010, Birnberg & Ganguly, 2012). 
In a series of papers (Dickhaut et al. 2009a, 2009b, 2010), Dickhaut and colleagues review 
neuroscience findings, which, they argue, support their recordkeeping hypothesis and more 
generally, the idea that many culturally evolved accounting principles are consistent with, and 
linked to, the brain’s evolution. In their review, they discuss a series of findings concerning the 
types of variables that the brain computes and draw parallels between those computations and 
specific accounting procedures including revenue realization and conservatism.   
Most of the findings that Dickhaut and colleagues present are, as Birnberg and Ganguly 
note, fairly generic (Birnberg & Ganguly, 2012) and would need to be tested in a financial context. 
More worrying however, for addressing their question of interest, is the serious difficulty in 
distinguishing culturally and genetically determinants of brain activity and behaviour. This is a 
crucial issue that they do not explicitly discuss. Looking at the brain nowadays will indeed help us 
understand the brain computations underlying these accounting procedures but can do little in 
clarifying whether these computations were already present before or after societies started using 
those same accounting principles. For one, there is the problem of correlation of recording 
techniques, preventing drawing conclusions of whether the activity observed is causally related to 
the behaviour observed. But even if we established the causality between “present brain activity” 
and “present behaviour”, which new techniques allow, we are still left with the serious issue of 
establishing the direction of the causal relationship in evolutionary terms: whether the way the 




procedures. Accounting principles may have evolved because of how the brain worked, as 
Dickhaut et al. suggest, but it is also possible, given the large body of neuroscience research 
showing that our brain can change even in adulthood (e.g. Maguire et al., 2000), that our brain has 
adapted to efficiently deal with culturally imposed accounting principles.  
This is a general issue that is often ignored in evolutionary psychology arguments. 
Biological basis should not be confused with genetically determined basis. Since both genetics and 
culture shape brain function, it is not enough to look at present-day adult human brain activity to 
distinguish whether certain function is hardwired, culturally determined or results from an 
interaction of the two. Thus, to address evolutionary hypothesis, one must rely on comparative 
studies looking across different related species (Kalenscher & van Wingerden, 2011). Although, 
Dickhaut and colleagues do present some non-human primate research, they do not explicitly 
discuss their importance for addressing their questions. Future work in this area should focus on 
comparing across species that are evolutionary close to humans but have not experienced the same 
cultural forces.     
In the same year that Dickhaut and colleagues began to present their work, the term 
“neuroaccounting” also appeared in a conference in Brazil (Cesar et al., 2009). In this work, which 
was subsequently published (Cesar et al. 2012a), Cesar and colleagues incorporated findings from 
neuroscience into a theoretical model of decision-making, including variables that have been 
traditionally ignored in economic models i.e. emotions. They focused on management decision-
making. More specifically, in budget targeting decisions.  
They based themselves on two important findings from psychology and neuroscience 
research (reviewed in Camerer et al., 2005). First, that much of the processing that goes on in the 
brain occurs automatically, and without conscious deliberation (Scheiner & Shiffrin 1977, Shiffrin 
& Scheiner 1977). Second, that our judgements and decisions are critically dependent on, and 
strongly influenced by, emotional factors. The importance of emotions to “rational” decision-
making is clear from the dramatic decision-making impairments seen in patients with disrupted 
emotional processing (Damásio, 1994).  Importantly, and as Camerer et al. (2005) emphasize, the 
growing literature suggests that the two axis (affective/cognitive and automatic/controlled 
processing) are orthogonal. Contrary to the frequent assumption that emotional processing is 
always automatic, and that cognitive processing is always deliberate; several studies show 
instances of automatic cognitive processing (e.g. pattern recognition in visual perception or 
language processing) and of controlled emotional processing (e.g. cognitive emotional regulation) 
(Camerer et al., 2005).  
Based on this, Cesar et al. (2012a) developed a theoretical framework to more realistically 
model budget targeting decisions that incorporates both the mode (controlled or automatic) and 
information processed (cognitive or affective). With this model, the authors hope to promote the 
development of accounting support systems within organizations that can anticipate the influence 




exploiting them in the best possible way. They discuss that, for instance, automatic processing can 
be very advantageous to investors in some situations, allowing them to identify, through 
experience, the patterns of information that best predict positive outcomes. However, because of 
its inflexible nature, the automatic (or habitual) behaviour may become maladaptive, preventing 
the investor to detect or rapidly adapt to changes in contingencies (when the old pattern of 
information is no longer predictive).    
Since the proposal of the model, Cesar’s group has gone to considerable lengths to test and 
apply it. First in interviewed-based qualitative study with a sample of managers (Cesar et al. 2009) 
and later in several questionnaire-based quantitative studies in organizations from different sectors 
including transport, cosmetics and steel industry (Cesar et al 2010, Cesar et al. 2011, Valero et al 
2012).  
Although, an increasingly number of neuroscience researchers is proposing to move beyond 
binary-based classifications (e.g. affective vs. cognitive; automatic vs. deliberate) arguing that this 
cannot capture the complexity of these interactions (e.g. Phelps, Lempert & Sokol-Hessner, 2014), 
these models are still a useful starting point and as Cesar and colleagues have shown, can be very 
useful in translating academic research findings into organizational contexts.   
Cesar’s group has also started using neuroscientific tools to empirically test more specific 
questions about automatic processing in the context of accounting decision making (Cesar et al., 
2012b). They combined behavioural analysis and electrocephalogram (EEG) recordings to 
examine the influence of automatic processes, namely implicit learning, on accounting-based 
decisions.  As discussed in previous sections, it is a fairly crude measure sampling activity over 
large areas of the brain, but it is a relatively cheap method and has high temporal resolution, which 
makes it useful to look at temporal correlations between behavioural and neural events. They 
adapted the probability classification, or “weather prediction”, task commonly used in psychology 
and cognitive neuroscience (Knowlton et al., 1994, 1996), to study non-declarative (implicit) 
learning and memory. In this task, participants are asked to predict the weather (if it will rain or 
shine) based on a combination of visual cues. The cues are probabilistically related to the outcome, 
but subjects are not told what that relationship is.  
Studies on these probabilistic learning tasks have shown that after some exposure, 
individual become very good at these tasks, despite being apparently unaware of how they are 
solving them. The dissociation between explicit and implicit learning becomes even more evident 
when examining two different groups of patients. Patients that became amnesic after damage to 
the medial temporal areas show intact performance in this (implicit) task, despite being profoundly 
impaired in explicit memory tests. Whereas Parkinson and Huntington’s patients, that have 
dysfunctional basal ganglia circuits, show the opposite pattern (Knowlton et al., 1996), suggesting 
that these two types of learning are not only dissociable at the psychological but also, at least 




Cesar et al. build on these findings to study automatic learning in the context of investment 
decisions (Cesar et al., 2012b). In their task, participants were asked to forecast this year’s 
investment level for 200 offices of the same company, based on graphically presented information. 
They were shown 4 different panels each with one indicator, i.e. profit projections or cash 
earnings.  What participants did not know was that only two of these indicators were relevant for 
solving the task and that their different combinations predicted the correct level of investment.  To 
assess whether investors were paying attention to all or just a subset of the information, Cesar et 
al. added a twist. They combined 4 graphical indicators to reflect either realist (congruent) or 
impossible (incongruent) scenarios. The prediction was that if participants were processing the 
information as a whole, they would be sensitive to the manipulation. What they found was that in 
line with the results from the weather prediction task, participants became progressively better at 
solving the task, even though when later asked, most of them could not identify the “hidden rule”. 
Interestingly, the authors showed that the congruency of the information only affected choice in 
the beginning of the session but not later on, consistent with the idea that the reliance on the 
information subset is learned over the session. Despite not affecting performance later on, 
congruency did affect how long subjects took to respond (they were slower in incongruent trials) 
and it modulated EEG signals. This pattern of results suggests that although they learned to only 
rely on a subset, participants still continued to process, at least to some extent, the entire set. Cesar 
et al.’s study is a good example of how tools and paradigms from neuroscience may be adapted 
and applied to examine behavioural accounting questions.  
Another recent study employing EEG to measure brain activity while auditors and 
accountants assessed information to make judgements about “going concern” probability 
(Carvalho, 2012). What the author found was that although both groups behaved similarly, 
including being more sensitive to blocks with negative evidence, they had different EEG patterns, 
which may suggest the use of different strategies. The authors go further by trying to suggest how 
each group is deciding, claiming that accountants show “more cognitive effort” and existence of 
“conflict” (Carvalho 2012, e.g. p. 120-121). Unfortunately, the authors claim this not by directly 
testing their hypothesis but by inferring them from the differences in brain patterns, an example of 
reverse inference (see Section 4.1) that, in this particular case, is aggravated by other weakly 
supported assumptions. The author says that activity in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC, see 
Appendix II) indicates the existence of “conflict” because previous studies have correlated activity 
in this area with conflict (e.g. Botvinick et al, 2004 for a review). This conclusion is in itself 
arguable, since ACC activity has also been correlated with other cognitive functions (Yarkoni et 
al., 2011), but more worrying is assuming activation of ACC based on data from an electrode 
located in the front of the brain that is capturing activity from numerous different brain areas. 
Despite the perhaps overly ambitious interpretation, Carvalho’s study does show an interesting 




More recently, two different groups started applying functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRI) technology to investigate accounting issues. Barton et al. (2014) used fMRI to explore how 
the brain processes earnings news. Their hypothesis was that announcements convey information 
to investors akin to reward and punishments (where reward is traditionally defined as an appetitive 
stimuli that reinforces behaviour and punishment defined as a negative, aversive stimuli that 
diminishes it). 
Based on previous neuroscience studies showing that ventral striatal activity correlates with 
predictions errors (e.g. McClure, Berns & Montague, 2003), the authors hypothesised that earnings 
news would lead to ventral striatum activation. Specifically, they predicted that positive earnings 
(like reward prediction errors) would lead to increased activity in ventral striatum (see Appendix 
II) and negative would decrease it. 
To test this hypothesis, they showed investors earnings per share disclosed by 60 publicly 
traded companies. Before imaging, subjects were asked to forecast each companies earnings 
(based on the historical earnings per share and on a forecast made by financial analysts). They 
were also asked to choose between a short and long equity position in its stock to then finally view 
the actual earnings of each company. Only in this final stage they were imaged. The authors 
showed that indeed earnings surprise led to changes in ventral striatum activity (the only region 
analysed), with an asymmetric effect for negative and positive surprise. In addition they showed 
that other variables such as investor personality traits, and firms earnings predictability modulated 
this response. They went further to analyse how ventral striatal activity related to market-level 
phenomena, showing a correlation between the magnitude of ventral striatal response and market-
level measures such as stock returns and trading levels.  
Farrel et al. (2014) also used fMRI and behavioural analysis but to explore a different 
question: how compensation plan design influences investment choices. Based on dual processing 
theories that classify processing into automatic (system 1) and deliberate (system 2), they aimed to 
examine the influence of contracts (performance-based incentive or fixed wage) on choice and 
brain activity in emotionally charged scenarios. More specifically, they wanted to investigate the 
influence of these factors (contract and emotion) on (putative) “system 1” and “system 2” 
processing.  
To test this, they manipulated affect and contract type in a task that presented subjects with 
a series of investment decisions. Participants had to choose between two investment projects 
recommended by two different proposers: a familiar (previously associated with negative, positive 
or neutral descriptions) or unfamiliar. Importantly the experiment was designed in such a way that 
decisions based on affective reactions (positive or negative) would lead to less profitable 
decisions. From the behavioural data, they showed that the percentage of non-optimal choices was 
lower in the performance-based contract relative to fixed contract condition.  They then looked for 
areas that were more active in the affective versus neutral context in each type of contract. They 




contract types, and some areas, putatively associated with “system 2”, only in the performance-
based contract. Based on this they claim that, first, affect induced “system 1 processing” and 
second, that in performance-based contracts, system 2 is additionally engaged to “at least partially 
override” system 1 (Farrel et al., 2014). 
Besides the lack of explicit statistical comparison between the two contracts that would be 
needed to claim differences between those conditions, the interpretation is problematic. As the 
authors acknowledge briefly in the discussion, the mapping between System 1 and 2 modes of 
processing and different brain networks is premature: “(…) we use a System 1-System 2 
framework as a way to connect dual process theories and neuroscience research. However, 
neuroscience is far from definitively establishing the functions of individual brain regions and how 
regions interact when performing particular tasks. As such, our use of the System 1–System 2 
framework and our identification of relevant brain regions within them is an early step in bringing 
this work to accounting.” (Farrel et al., 2014, p. 2005). Indeed, although dual-system theories may 
be a useful heuristics to think about different modes of processing, there is little evidence for a 
clear separation between the two, even less for dissociable neural substrates (Lempert & Phelps, 
2014, Phelps et al., 2014). Thus, interpretations based on these weak mappings should be 
cautiously considered. 
Indeed, even if we did accept that there were dissociable neural correlates for the two types 
of processing, we would still be left with the difficult task of inferring cognitive processes (type 1 
or 2 processing) from brain activity – another example of reverse inference. For example, the 
authors use the fact that previous studies have shown that “the left inferior insula (…) is associated 
with negative emotions such as anger and disgust (…)” (Farrel et al., 2014, p. 1994), as evidence 
that participants (who show insula activation) are engaging in System 1 processing. Yet, this is not 
a valid conclusion since one third of all fMRI studies (including studies using different cognitive 
tasks) detect insula activation (Yarkoni et al., 2011). 
4.2.3. Summary  
Recent years have seen the appearance of a number of studies starting to incorporate 
neuroscience findings and its tools in the study of behavioural accounting issues. The field is still 
at a very early stage, and the initial studies, although important first steps, need to be carefully and 
critically considered, e.g. conclusions drawn from the use of reverse inference. Much more needs 
to be done until this type of work has real impact in accounting research. Nonetheless, as already 
discussed by several researchers (e.g. Birnberg and Ganguly, 2012) and hinted by this initial 
stream of studies, the interaction between neuroscience, psychology and behavioural accounting 




5. THE ROLE OF PRESENTATION FORMAT IN DECISION-MAKING 
Previous sections reviewed the different approaches and the possibilities for interaction 
between neuroscience, psychology, economics and behavioural accounting. This section will 
review research from these fields pertinent to the study of the impact of format variables on the 
processing and use of financial accounting information. The focus here is in understanding the 
regularities of how humans acquire, process and weight information to make judgements and 
choices, irrespective of whether they translate into choice behaviours that are in line or deviate 
from what normative theories predict. Rather than a comprehensive list, we review those areas of 
research that seemed more relevant for this particular question.     
Most of the research that will be presented is not directly addressing financial decision 
making or financial information itself, but is in line with the belief that by understanding the 
simple (e.g. decision-making in perceptual tasks), we will be better prepared to conceptualize and 
tackle the more complex (e.g. decisions based on financial accounting information). Furthermore, 
it highlights methodological approaches that can be adapted to financial accounting research. 
5.1. Do the format and presentation of information matter?  
5.1.1. Individual and market evidence      
Standard economic theory assumes that “incidental” variables, that is, factors irrelevant to 
the decision outcomes, should have no influence on choice. Yet, a wealth of data suggests that 
humans are often influenced by such seemingly irrelevant factors making choices that are 
inconsistent or intransitive and that fail to maximise reward (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974, 1981). 
A classic example is the framing effect in which small variations in how information is 
presented, or “framed”, lead to dramatic differences in choice (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981). In 
their experiment, the authors asked subjects to choose between alternative disease-prevention 
strategies: in one scenario the options (a certain and a risky option) were presented in terms of live 
saved, in the other the same outcomes were presented in terms of lives lost. Despite the fact that 
the scenarios had equivalent outcomes, subjects overwhelmingly preferred the certain option in the 
“lives saved” (positive) frame and the risky option in the “lives lost” (negative) frame. This effect 
has since been shown to hold across a variety of different conditions.  
These and similar results have clearly shown that even small differences in how information 
is presented, including changes in the order in which information is presented (Hogarth & 
Einhorff, 1992), the way in which it is described (Framing) or how it is organized (“chunking”, 
e.g. Miller, 1956) can systematically influence judgement and choices. 
These finding have important implications for financial accounting as they suggest that how 
accounting information is disclosed may have an impact on evaluations and trading decisions at an 
individual level and potentially even influence market outcomes.  
Indeed, evidence has begun to emerge in behavioural finance suggesting that subtle 




Mercer, 2005). For example, Cotter and Zimmer (2003) find that investors are more likely to 
positively value information about a firm’s asset revaluation if the information is recognized in the 
main body of the financial statement rather than in footnotes (Cotter & Zimmer, 2003). Others 
have shown that whether the same information is placed in the income statement or statement of 
change in equity can have a systematic influence on analysts’ forecasts (Hirst & Hopkins, 1998). 
The order in which information is disclosed has also been found to systematically influence 
investors’ judgements. For example, Tuttle, Cotter and Burton (1997) find that investors show a 
recency effect, a well described effect in psychology: people are more likely to recall and weight 
information that was displayed at end of a document or more recently presented (Hogarth & 
Einhorn, 1992). 
Clearly understanding the underlying psychological and neural processes engaged in 
processing information and the factors that shape it can shed light into the underlying structure 
behind these behavioural effects. But is this of any use for understanding market level 
phenomena?  
Proponents of the Efficient Market Hypothesis do not claim that individual decision makers 
cannot be biased, but rather that at the market level, these individual processing bias will be 
eliminated. Either by the action of sophisticated, rational traders who, by exploiting the 
inefficiencies created, will ensure that prices always revert back to their fundamental value - a 
phenomenon known as arbitrage (Friedman, 1953, as cited in Barbaris & Thaler, 2003), or because 
(random) inefficiencies will cancel out.  
However, this has been called into question. First, emerging evidence suggests that real 
world arbitrate may in fact be limited (eg. Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Barbaris & Thaler, 2003). 
Secondly, the fact that equivalent are observed in non-human animals (Chen et al., 2006, 
Kalenscher & van Wingerden, 2011) suggest that these biases may in fact reflect, at least in part, 
regularities in the processes and neural substrates that are strongly conserved across phylogeny. 
Indeed, research in behavioural finance and accounting suggests that even experts are susceptible 
to judgement biases (e.g. Hirst & Hopkins, 1998, DeBondt and Thaler, 1985), and that biases seen 
at the individual level, including disclosure-related ones, can extend to market (e.g. Tuttle et al., 
1997).  
5.1.2. Summary and implications for financial reporting   
There is growing evidence to suggest that small differences in information format can 
influence judgement and choice. This has strong implication for the design and regulation of 
financial accounting reports as it suggests that not only what but how information is disclosed can 
influence evaluation and trading decision. Further understanding these effects and optimally 
designing financial accounting reports will depend on clarifying both the psychological and neural 
processes behind them. The following sections attempt to review and discuss pertinent existent 




5.2. How and why format affects processing and decision making?  
We know from psychology and behavioural finance research that contrary to what standard 
economic theory suggests judgement and choices are not “description-invariant” (e.g. Kahneman 
& Tversky, 1981). Incidental variables such as the way a decision problem is described, the 
number of alternatives to be considered, among others, can profoundly affect choice. But this only 
tells us that decision makers do not meet normative assumptions, not how or why. To understand 
which variables drive these effects, we need to understand the underlying processes involved. 
This section reviews what we know about the psychological and neural processes that 
support decision-making, and how they are influenced by variables related to the presentation of 
the information, including its visual presentation and computational requirements. 
5.2.1. We don’t see it all – the need for selection and its determinants 
5.2.1.1. Selective attention – what is it and why we need it  
Perception and cognition are capacity limited and thus we are, at any moment, limited in 
how much information we can acquire, process and use (Marois & Ivanoff, 2005). This limited 
processing capacity dictates a need for selection. Attention refers to the collection of processes by 
which the brain prioritizes and selects information according to their behavioural relevance 
(Marois & Ivanoff, 2005, Chun, Golomb & Turk-Browne, 2001). The primary goal of attention 
research is to understand which information is selected; how it is selected and what happens to 
both selected and unselected streams of information.  
Multiple stimuli or options compete for selection and the goal of attention is to bias 
competition in favour of a target stimuli or event (see Desimone & Duncan, 1995 for a recent 
model). For example, in a cocktail party we may want to focus on a conversation with a friend and 
not on all other conversations and competing sounds. Selection has however a cost: unattended 
information may be missed, whether it is an important announcement in the cocktail party, a traffic 
light while driving and talking on the phone (Strayer & Johnson, 2001) or a gorilla passing right in 
front of our eyes while we focus on a challenging task (Simons & Chabris, 1999). Interestingly, 
this research has also shown that we are largely unaware of these costs, thinking that we “see” all 
that is around us when in fact we miss a large part of it (Simon & Chabris 1999). 
Attention is not a unitary process (Chun et al., 2001) and one way researchers have used to 
classify it is based on the type of information over which it operates: whether a spatial location, an 
object or a feature. Spatial attention concerns how to prioritize spatial locations in the 
environment, it is central to vision and often compared to a “spotlight” that moves in the visual 
field (Cave and Bichot, 1999). It can be overt (linked to eye movements), or covert, where location 
is attended without being fixated (Juan et al., 2004).  
Attention can also be directed to features or objects. Features are points in modality-specific 
dimensions such as colour, saltiness and temperature (Chun et al., 2001). The saliency of features, 




we will see, a primary determinant in attention selection. Finally, attention can also be directed 
towards whole objects that may include several distinct features (O’Craven et al., 1999).  
At the neural level, a number of neurophysiological and neuroimaging studies have shown 
that attention is reflected in an enhancement in the neural representation of task-relevant 
information. This occurs at the expense of competing and irrelevant stimuli, which are suppressed 
(Vuilleumier, 2005). For example, attention to specific features (e.g. colour) directly modulates 
and enhances the processing within feature-selective (e.g. color-related) brain areas (Reynolds & 
Chelazzi, 2004).  
5.2.1.2. Attention control – How is attention allocated?  
There are two modes of attention control that determine which aspects of the available 
information gets prioritized: a goal-directed, by which attention is voluntarily driven by 
knowledge, expectations and current goals (eg. searching for the car key), and a stimulus-driven 
mode, in which attention is automatically captured by salient features or events in the environment 
(e.g. orienting to a sudden noise) (Chun et al., 2001). 
Both modes of attention are pervasive in our everyday life and it is the interaction between 
them that determines, at any given moment, where, how and what we attend to. Each mode has its 
benefits and costs: voluntary attentional control is goal specific but relatively slower to implement. 
By contrast, involuntary attentional capture can be very rapid and adaptive in many situations i.e. 
rapid orienting towards threatening stimuli, but can also lead to distraction and maladaptive 
behaviour (Chun et al., 2001). 
These two control modes can be studied in the lab using different paradigms. To capture 
attention in a stimulus-driven way, one can use a cue such as a flashing light, at the same location 
of a target. This cue will draw attention to that location, facilitating the detection of targets 
presented in that position and slowing down detection of targets at other locations.  
To study goal-directed attention, researchers usually use a symbolic cue such as an arrow or 
a left/right word, that is presented at the centre of the screen and that informs, in advance, the 
participants about where the target will most probably appear. Cueing in this manner typically 
facilitates the subsequent detection of the target (Chun et al., 2001). 
5.2.1.3. What features of the input capture attention?  
The fact that attention can be stimulus-driven, that is, controlled by features of the visual 
display, independent of our say, means that salient items even if task-irrelevant will be prioritized 
over, and divert processing capacity from, less salient potentially important items. One key 
question is what determines the ability of a stimulus, event or information, to automatically attract 
or bias attention. 
5.2.1.3.1. Perceptual saliency  




example, we will automatically and effortlessly detect a red flower in a green field – a 
phenomenon referred to as “pop out” (Treisman & Gelade, 1980) 
5.2.1.3.2. Emotional ‘saliency’ of the stimuli 
Emotional stimuli are also effective attractors of attention, capturing it often in a reflexive 
and involuntary manner (Vuillumier, 2005). A famous example is the easiness with which we 
detect our name, even if it comes up in a conversation we were not attending to.  
Evidence for the importance of emotional saliency comes from visuals search paradigms, in 
which emotion-laded stimuli such as an angry or happy face (e.g. Fox, 2002) or a snake among 
flowers (e.g. Ohman et al., 2001) are found to be more rapidly detected than a neutral stimulus.  In 
spatial orienting task, targets are detected faster if they appear on the same side as an emotional 
cue, e.g. threat word or a shape previously associated with a fearful stimulus (Vuilleumier, 2005). 
Emotions can even influence sampling and detection without our awareness. Evidence for 
this comes from variety of subliminal paradigms such as the visual background masking, in which 
briefly presented targets can be made invisible if immediately followed by a second masking 
stimulus. If what is “hidden” is an emotional stimulus, subjects will show changes in physiological 
measures such as skin conductance response, even if the target is not consciously detected (Dolan, 
2002).  
We are now beginning to understand some of the neural mechanisms involved in this 
phenomenon. Electrophysiological studies show rapid and widespread neuronal responses to 
emotional stimulus that precedes responses associated with actual stimulus identification (Dolan, 
2002). The amygdala – a small, almond shaped nucleus in the medial temporal lobe (see Appendix 
II) - seems to be an important mediator of emotional influences on perception.  This area is known 
to be crucial for fear processing and learning but also for a wider range of functions related to the 
affective significant of stimulus and reflexive emotional reactions. Visual information is thought to 
reach the amygdala in two ways: through a slow, cortical, route that sends fully processed 
information (the standard visual pathway) and a fast, subcortical, route that sends very coarse, but 
rapid, visual inputs to allow for early detection prior to full perceptual processing (Romanski & 
LeDoux, 1992, Phelps, 2006). For example, a stick that looks like a snake would trigger a rapid 
“flight or fight” response through the fast route. Once the stimulus was recognized as a harmless 
wood stick by the slow route, the response would be terminated.  
Consistent with amygdala playing an important role, a study using fMRI and visual 
backwards masking found amygdala responses that can discriminate between unseen emotional 
and unseen non-emotional targets (Morris et al., 1998).  
The power of emotional stimuli can be adaptive in many circumstances (e.g. detecting 





5.2.1.3.3. Learned value  
Simuli can capture attention by their intrinsic physical properties or intrinsic (possibly 
innate) value, but also through their acquired importance. Previously neutral, irrelevant stimuli 
can, through association with biologically relevant outcomes such as reward and punishment, 
become powerful attractors of attention. These associations are learned and can automatically bias 
attention, even when they are irrelevant to the current goal.  
This value-based mechanisms of attention capture may be useful for rapidly detecting 
potential rewards in complex natural scenes but can also introduce suboptimal biases by 
prioritizing desirable over accurate information (Gottlieb et al., 2014). Such learned effects have 
been suggested to underlie the “optimistic bias” observed in risky decision making, leading to 
underestimation of unpleasant information (Sharot, 2011).  A brain area called anterior cingulate 
cortex, located in the most frontal and medial part of the brain, appears to play an important role in 
this phenomenon  (Sharot, 2011).  
5.2.1.4. What determines the amount of processing of attended and non-attended information? 	
5.2.1.4.1. Perceptual load 
For years, psychologist debated whether the “bottleneck” of attention was at earlier 
perceptual levels or later in processing, with empirical data to support each of the views. Recently, 
based on findings from an attention task in which a visual stimulus (the target) needs to be 
detected from among other stimulus (distractors), Lavie et al. (2004) have proposed a theory that 
reconciles the two views. The basic idea is that the amount of processing that unattended stimuli 
receive depends on how difficult it is to process the attended target. If detecting the target is easy, 
e.g. it is very different from the distractors, then there will be attentional resources left to process 
unattended stimuli and they will impact behavioural performance (Lavie, 2005). If the detection is 
very difficult, e.g. there are many distractors, then all resources will be devoted to the target, and 
the unattended items will be filtered out early in processing. This is seen in the brain as an 
attenuation of neural responses in the brain areas that process the distractors and an enhancement 
of target-related neural activity (e.g. Chen et al., 2008). 
Other stimulus manipulations, collectively referred to as perceptual load manipulations, 
include decreasing the quality of the stimulus, increasing the number of distractions, increasing the 
similarity between targets and distractions or define the target as conjunctions (e.g. red square) 
instead of a single features (e.g. a red shape) (Lavie et al., 2004, Lavie, 2005).  
5.2.1.4.2. Cognitive load 
The amount of information processing does not only depend on the perceptual load but also 
on the amount of cognitive resources available for processing (referred as “cognitive load”). For 
instance, if the subject is required to hold in memory or carry a calculation while simultaneously 




This happens because attention allocation depends on certain cognitive processes to actively 
maintain stimulus-processing priorities throughout performance of the task. Any manipulation that 
loads these control processes (e.g. loading working memory) will results in a “loss of control” over 
the focus of attention, leading to increased task-irrelevant processing (Chun et al., 2011).  
The cognitive control processes can be seen as just another attentional process that rather 
than selecting externally-originated input, selects and coordinates processing among different 
internal representations including representations from working memory or long term memory, 
task rules, decisions and responses (Chun et al., 2011, Miller & Cohen, 2001).  
Perceptual or ‘external’ attention and cognitive control or ‘internal attention’ share partially 
overlapping fronto-parietal networks but with some differences (Chen et al., 2011, Nobre et al, 
2004). Esterman and colleagues compared brain activity associated with switching spatial 
attention (external), switching task set (internal) and switching along memory representation 
(internal). They found that a region of superior parietal cortex was involve in all types of 
switching, but that they could train multivariate classifiers to differentiate between the patterns 
evoked by spatial attention versus cognitive control (Esterman et al., 2009).  
Cognitive load manipulations include increasing the number of items that must be 
maintained in working memory or performing other executive functions such as task switching 
(Lavie et al., 2004). 
Working memory is at the interface between ‘external’ attention and cognitive control. 
It enables the maintenance and manipulation of information in the absence of sensory support 
(D’Esposito et al., 1995) and is thus required for short-term memory and for manipulation of both 
thought and memory. Working memory is an essential to most daily activities from holding in 
mind a phone number to complex mental arithmetic. 
Research on working memory has been trying to quantify its limits. For visual material, we 
appear to hold, on average, only 4 items (Luck & Vogel, 1997, Buschman et al., 2011). For verbal 
material, we have capacity of about seven ’chunks’ (Miller, 1956) and its effectiveness depends on 
the phonetic characteristics of the acoustic input (e.g. words) being rehearsed (Baddeley, 1992).  
When performed simultaneously, working memory tasks can disrupt simple spatial orienting 
(Dell’Acqua et al., 2006) and visual search (Han & Kim, 2004). The interaction is bidirectional: 
working memory contents can influence “external” attention but “external” attention can also 
influence what gets maintained in working memory (Chun et al., 2011).  The most common way to 
manipulate working memory specifically is to increase the number of items that needs to be 
maintained “online” in memory.  
At the brain level, working memory maintenance appears to rely on signals from the 
prefrontal cortex that modulate processing in relevant sensory cortex and suppresses irrelevant 




5.2.1.5. Summary and implications for financial reporting  
The findings reviewed highlight the importance of considering the level and type of load 
involved in any task. Simply instructing people to focus attention on a certain aspect of 
information is not sufficient to guarantee processing (Lavie, 2005). 
Applied to financial reports, these findings suggest that efficient processing of goal-relevant 
information will depend on the characteristics of the report itself (e.g. how much information is 
present, how salient it appears, if information is explicitly signalled as important, whether 
calculations are required), but also on whether cognitive resources are being “taken up” by 
concurrent processing (e.g. sampling information while simultaneously manipulating information 
in working memory).  Future research should directly test these ideas, adapting these simple 
paradigms for stimuli more close to financial information. In these conditions loading cognitive 
resources, i.e. loading working memory, should result in less efficient information sampling, 
potentially making decision makers more prone to “incidental”, task-irrelevant factors.  
5.2.2. Computational costs as a determinant of decision strategy  
Standard economic theories see the agent as maximizing some utility function. Some 
models consider factors such as the delay or the uncertainty of the outcomes, but always under the 
assumption that the agent is capable of and wants to perform all the computational steps required 
for these estimations.  
Behavioural research has shown repeatedly that humans deviate from the predictions of 
these normative theories, and based on this data, many researchers have suggested a number of 
non-normative “heuristic” rules that decision makers may be using. However, so far it has not 
been clear what are the factors that determine whether a certain decision rule is used over the 
other. If a certain optimal strategy is simply not computationally possible given our brains, it is 
easy to see why we would not use it, but even then, how do we choose between the possible 
alternatives? In many situations it is not even clear whether people are not capable of solving a 
problem optimally or whether they simply chose not to (e.g. in situations where people are able to 
later correct their answers). One possibility is that agents are trading off different costs and 
benefits, but many of which are not considered in classical economical models i.e. emotional 
factors and cognitive, or mental, effort. 
5.2.2.1. Cognitive effort discounting  
Cognitive load does not only influence what information gets sampled and processed, but it 
can also affect how a decision problem is approached. The amount of cognitive effort required to 
solve a particular problem appears to be experienced as subjectively costly, and discounted in the 
selection of the decision rule or strategies.  
An influential idea has been that decision makers select a decision strategy by trading off 
the effort costs and the accuracy benefits of different computational demanding strategies (e.g. 




In certain circumstances, optimal strategies may be computationally intractable, and thus not 
feasible, as Simon (Simon, 1955) pointed out when proposing the concept of Bounded rationality. 
Even when multiple strategies are available, decision makers do not necessarily employ the 
“normative” one, but rather compare the various options using a cost-benefit analysis, in which 
cognitive demands are incorporated as a cost (Kool et al. 2010, Botvinick & Braver, 2015).    
The idea of cognitive or mental effort as a “cost”, that is avoided or minimized in the 
context of decision-making, is long lived in psychology. A wide range of observations in 
psychology, behavioural economics and consumer research have been discussed in terms of effort-
avoidance (eg. Tversky & Kahneman, 1974, Payne et al., 1988, Monsel, 2003). A number of 
processing models have also explicitly incorporated a principle of “least effort”, referring to the 
demands of automatic versus controlled information processing (Gray, 2000). Yet until recently, it 
had not been directly tested.  
Kool and colleagues were one of the first to do it (Kool et al., 2010). They conducted a 
series of experiments in which participants could select between strategies that differed in the 
amount of cognitive demand. Across a variety of tasks, they found that decisions makers have a 
systematic bias towards the less demanding strategy and that this result cannot be explained by a 
desire to simply minimize the time spent on the task or increase the reward rate received. One of 
the experiments they performed is particularly interesting for the present discussion. Building on 
previous evidence that “carrying” digits increases computational complexity of a mathematic 
problem, and that it places demands specifically on working memory control processes (e.g. “hold 
on” the digit, manipulate the information, etc.), the authors designed a task where participants 
could choose to solve one of two possible 2-digit mathematical problems. One that required 
carrying a digit and other that did not. Consistent with the idea of cognitive demands avoidance, 
they found that people systematically avoided the strategy that involved carrying a digit, in favour 
of a less demanding option (Kool et al., 2010). 
A number of studies have begun to uncover the neural basis of how such control costs are 
registered and to identify which decision processes are sensitive to them. The anterior cingulate 
cortex (ACC) is thought to be a central area for physical effort-based decision-making. Rats with 
ACC lesions show decreased willingness to engage in physical work to earn reward (Walton et al. 
2006). In addition some neurons in this area have been shown to code physical effort during an 
effort-based decision-making. Projections of the dopaminergic system, a chemical messenger in 
the brain, to an area called the ventral striatum and to the ACC also appear to be involved, with 
dopamine blockage leading to reduced willingness to engage in effort based decisions.  
Initial studies on cognitive effort have shown that its underlying circuitry partially overlaps 
with that of physical effort, but with some distinctions (Botvinick & Braver, 2015).  Botvinick, 
Huffstetler and McGuire (2009) performed one of the first studies focusing on the neural signals 
that reflect cognitive control costs. In their experiment, participants performed various cognitive 




Critically, the response strength was modulated by the degree of cognitive effort that was required 
to obtain the reward. Specifically, reward responses were reduced when a high degree of mental 
effort was required by the task, consistent with the idea of cognitive effort discounting, in which 
the subject value of rewards are decremented by the cost in effort required to attain it (Botvinick et 
al., 2009).  
Consistent with this, Kool et al. (2013) showed that ventral striatal reward responses 
correlated negatively with the degree of activity in both the ACC and the dorsal prefrontal cortex 
during performance on a foregoing cognitive task, in which participants can choose between 
completing a currently presented task or forgo it and advance to the next trial (where they will be 
presented with a different task). Botvinick and colleagues have also shown that a manipulation of 
task switching demand influences activity in the nucleus accumbens (part of the ventral striatum) 
in response to reward (Botvinick et al., 2009). Specifically, rewards appeared to be discounted by 
the associated cognitive effort with responses in the nucleus accumbens being lower for higher 
levels of cognitive demands. 
Other studies have linked ACC and dPFC activity in driving cognitive effort avoidance. 
Magno et al. (2006) presented subjects with a series of search arrays that were attention 
demanding: for each array, participants could choice between identifying the presence or absence 
of a target OR to skip (forgo) that trial. Activity in both areas, measured with fMRI, was higher on 
trials in which subjects chose to forgo. Interestingly, the degree to which performance of a 
cognitively demanding task engaged these regions, was shown to predict the extent to which the 
task would be later avoided (McGuire & Botvinick, 2010).  
Finally, it has been shown that participants show elevated skin conductance responses just 
before selecting a high demand alternative (Botvinick & Rosen, 2009). This may reflect 
anticipatory avoidance mechanisms in response to effort requirements.    
An open question is the origin of these cognitive costs. One possibility is that it may arise 
from the consumption of resources throughout the brain, for example, from the use of a resource 
pool (Reichle et al, 2000). Alternatively, costs may be specifically related to the engagement of 
control processes (Miller & Cohen, 2001). According to this view, costs should originate in brain 
regions that are consistently engaged in situations where control is required. Two main regions 
identified in such situations are the PFC and the ACC (Duncan & Owen, 2000).  
5.2.2.2. Summary and implications for financial reporting 
Contrarily to what was traditionally assumed in economic theories, computational demands 
are an important factor is how the decision makers will solve a decision problem. In the context of 
financial reporting this suggests that different financial accounting reporters may encourage the 
use of different decision-making strategies. Until recently, the literature presented a somewhat 
binary view as either do it “optimally” or “non-optimally”, but there is continuous spectrum of 




crucial if we want to have a handle on how different forms of input (e.g. formats of financial 
information) impact decision processes and its output (e.g. judgements or choices).  
The research reviewed in this section shows that cognitive effort is one of these factors 
influencing which decision strategy is used. This suggests that to encourage the use of a particular 
strategy (more or less close to what is considered optimal) and/or a consistent strategy across 
different situations (e.g. evaluating reports from different companies), then we ought to pay 
attention to the cognitive demands that our format imposes (e.g. whether it requires “carrying” a 
digit, holding information “online”). Unfortunately our knowledge of the specific features of a task 
or report that make it more or less demanding is still scares. More research is needed to identify 
the features of the input or tasks translate into cognitive (i.e. memory, attention, representation) 
demands.  
5.2.3. Context dependent coding as a possible mechanism for presentation effects   
We have been discussing how display or presentation variables may influence decision 
processes and ultimately judgements and choice. These are all examples of “incidental” variables 
that according to traditional economic theories should have no influence on decisions. Yet, 
research shows that they clearly play an important role. The most well studied example of these 
presentation or, more generally, context dependencies is the framing effect. In this section, we 
review research on the neurobiological mechanisms and computations that may underlie these 
effects. This is aimed not by any means as an explanation of all the presentation effects presented 
so far, but rather as an example of how behavioural, computational and neuroscientific disciplines 
can work together to better understand behavioural phenomena that would appear puzzling and 
inexplicable in the eyes of traditional economic models.  
Changing simple presentation variables such as the description of prospects can robustly 
affect choice. Prospect theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1979) explained these and other pattern of 
results by introducing a reference point, whereby decision makers view gains and losses in relative 
manner (against normative model assumption that the value of options are evaluated in an absolute 
manner, independent of other alternatives). Although it has some explanatory power, the nature of 
the reference point is still under dispute (Louie & DeMartino, 2014). On-going research is 
beginning to outline the different brain regions that mediate these shifts and is starting to clarify 
neurobiological mechanisms that may underlie it.   
De Martino et al. (2006) examined the neural computations associated with the framing 
effect, using a subtle framing manipulation. Participants were told at the beginning of each trial 
that they had been given a certain amount of money (“You received 50 pounds”) and asked to 
choose between a safe option, e.g. a certain 20 pounds, or a gamble matched in expected value, 
e.g. 40% probability of receiving 50 pounds and 60% of receiving zero). The critical manipulation 
was in the wording of the safe option: in half of the trials the safe option was presented in a gain 




frame using the word lose (“lose 30pounds”). This simple manipulation elicited a robust framing 
effect with participants consistently preferring the safe option in the gain frame (57.1% trials) but 
not the loss frame (38.4%). Using fMRI, they found that the asymmetric choice pattern was 
associated with changes in amygdala activity: increasing when subjects chose the safe option in 
the positive context, but decreasing in the negative frame.   
One possibility that has been suggested for this pattern of results is that the amygdala 
updates the value of the safe option under the different contexts (Morrison et al., 2010). More 
specifically it may code an ’innate’ reflexive approach-avoidance signal depending on the frame, 
biasing subjects choice. Consistent with this idea, Guitart-Masip et al. (2010) showed that using 
aversive and appetitive conditioned stimuli could induce similar behavioural and neural patterns.    
Interestingly, subjects showed significant inter-subject variability in how susceptible they were to 
framing and this variability was correlated with activity in the medial orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), 
suggesting that perhaps OFC exerts control over the magnitude of framing, allowing individuals to 
make more consistent and less contextual dependent choices (De Martino et al., 2006) perhaps by 
modulation of the amygdala (Louie & De Martino, 2014).  
5.2.3.1. What is the origin of these contextual dependencies?  
A growing body of neuroscience evidence points to a possible mechanism that could be at 
the source of these behavioural effects.  
Unlike behaviourally inferred quantities such as utility, neural activity is constrained in both 
their minimal and maximal levels. To ensure efficient coding across a wide range of stimulus 
parameters, neural system use compensatory algorithms such as divisive normalization by which 
the response of neurons are divided by the summed activity of a pool of its neighbours. This 
ensures that neurons adjust their dynamic range to continue to efficiently code the input despite 
scale changes. These transformations produce an intrinsic relative, context dependent coding. 
These neurobiological constraints may be at the source of many cases of context-dependency in 
valuation.  
It is widely believed that neuronal firing rate (average activity) is a primary information 
carrier in neural activity. The relation between the input variable and the resulting spiking activity 
can be represented as an input-output function (Louie & De Martino, 2014).  Importantly, there are 
two fundamental limitations in this response function. First, firing rates are non-negative and thus 
cannot represent parameters below a certain level, and second, neurons are functionally 
constrained to a maximum rate of firing. This is because neurons need to recover for a minimum 
period of time before another electrical pulse can be transmitted (the refractory period). These 
constraints impose limitations on the dynamic range over which neurons can represent the inputs 
that they receive.  
One way to optimize their processing capacity is to adjust the dynamic range to match the 




response to the regularities of their inputs (Barlow, 1961, as cited in Louie & De Martino, 2014), 
so that if the input changes, the input-output function of the coding neuron adapts.  These 
adjustments in neural code, referred as gain control mechanisms, are widely implemented in the 
sensory system and have important consequences for perception and behaviour. One everyday 
example is our ability to see constant relative brightness even when faced with widely different 
levels of ambient illuminations (Louie & De Martino, 2014).  
Recent studies have shown that these gain control mechanisms are not limited to sensory 
systems but extend to higher order brain areas such as motor, parietal and orbitofrontal areas that 
have been implicated in decision-making (Louie & Glimcher, 2012). For example, in the parietal 
cortex, the activity of neurons associated with a particular action is strongly influences by its value 
(e.g. Sugrue et al. 2004). More importantly, this value representation is not absolute but relative: 
the activity of the neuron increase with increases in value of the represented action but decrease 
with the increase in value of alternative actions (e.g. Louie et al. 2011, Louie & Glimcher, 2012 
for a review). By making the neural representation of the value of one option dependent on the 
value of the other options, this normalization introduces an intrinsic context dependency.  
The question is then whether this mechanism is causal in affecting behaviour. One recent 
study points in this direction. Louie et al (2013) developed a choice model derived directly from 
neurophysiological data of value normalization that predicted significant context-dependent effects 
in stimulations, driven either by the value or number of alternative options. They then tested 
human and monkey behaviour under conditions in which the model specifically predicted context-
driven distortions of choice and found reliable results in both species, consistent with 
normalization.  
5.2.3.2 Summary and implications for financial reporting 
Understanding the neural mechanism that generate reference, context dependent choice will 
not only tell us more about the behavioural phenomena, but also allows us to link possible 
disparate behavioural phenomena that arise from a single underlying neural mechanism and 
distinguish separate ones that appear similar at the behavioural level but originate from different 
computational processes (Louie & De Martino, 2014).  
This is only one example, focused on reference dependence in decision-making, which is 
relevant to content framing in financial accounting reporting, but more generally, it serves as a 
model approach of how similar questions can be tackled. It touches several important ideas: first, 
that by understanding the constraints and computational principles at the level of neural coding 
(e.g. maximal and non-negative firing rates, adaptations to maintain useful dynamic ranges, among 
others) one can help refine psychological level theories to be more biologically plausible. Second, 
that understanding the neural computations behind behavioural effects can help us arrive at a more 




the same computational processes or not), and third, insight into mechanism can helps us better 
predict how different manipulations at the level of the input will impact the output behaviour.      
5.2.4. Beyond the information per se – the importance of emotional factors  
So far the focus has been on the presentation of information itself, but information is not in 
a vacuum. It is acquired by a decision-maker in a particular internal state. Some emotional 
influences on attentional process were already reviewed in previous sections. In this section, the 
focus is not on emotion-laden information, but on emotional states of the decision-maker himself 
that may also influence how information is processed and used.  
The hope is that by understanding how various affective variables impact processing, we 
can both better explain and predict decisions outcomes in financial contexts, but also devise 
strategies that will help people process information as efficiently as possible. Researchers still lack 
a single, widely accepted, definition of emotion, but most would agree that it is not a unitary 
construct and that it compromises various different components including autonomic responses 
(e.g. changed in heart rate), behavioural changes (e.g. tendency to approach or avoid) and 
cognitive changes (e.g. cognitive interpretation of these changes, subjective feeling) (Lempert & 
Phelps, 2014). In its more strict definition, emotion is used to describe a set of discrete reaction to 
an internal or external event, in contrast to the terms mood or stress that may be relatively 
longlasting and may not be tied to particular events. But while mood is mainly defined by 
subjective feelings, stress is characterized by specific physiological and neuro-hormonal changes 
(Lempert & Phelps, 2014). Usually the term “affect” is used as an umbrella term for these various 
processes (Lempert & Phelps, 2014). 
Affective research has distinguished two main ways in which affect can impact decision 
making, depending on whether those emotions are related (elicited by the choice options 
themselves) or unrelated to choice (a more general affective state).  
5.2.4.1. Incidental affect   
Incidental affect refers to a baseline affective state that is unrelated to the decision at hand 
but can nevertheless affect choice (Lempert & Phelps, 2014). Perhaps the most well studied 
example is stress. A growing body of research shows that stress can have a profound impact on 
decision-making. Most psychology research in this area has focused on inducing stress using a 
variety of laboratory stressors, e.g. immersion of arm in icy water or social competition, and 
assessing its impact on judgement and choice. One of the first of such studies (Porcelli & Delgado, 
2009) examined the impact of stress on the reflection bias: people’s tendency to show risk seeking 
in the loss domain and risk aversion in the gain domain (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). They 
showed that exposure to a physical stressor exaggerated this tendency, demonstrating that stress 
can impact choice even when the stressor is unrelated to the problem at hand.  
 Neuroscience research has focused on how stress may influence brain structure and 




increased heart rate), glucocorticoid release and rating of negative affect (Phelps et al., 2014). 
These changes have been shown to functionally impact a number of brain systems, including the 
prefrontal cortex, the amygdala and dopaminergic (dopamine is a brain chemical messenger) 
transmission in the striatum (Phelps et al., 2014). 
Porcelli & Delgado’s results and other similar findings (Starcke & Brand, 2012) have been 
interpreted as reflecting an increase in more automatic or habitual decision-making (as opposed to 
more deliberate, goal-directed), possibly by affecting “top-down” control by areas such as the 
prefrontal cortex (PFC). However, there is no direct evidence of diminished PFC involvement in 
any of the human behavioural tasks reviewed. There is one relevant study examining the impact of 
stress on goal-directed action in rodents that indeed found evidence for stress-induced changes in 
both PFC and striatum (Dias Ferreira et al., 2009). Dias Ferreira et al. (2009) examined how 
chronic stress influenced expression of goal directed vs. habitual actions in a task where the value 
of the outcome was manipulated. These so called “devaluations tasks” are a commonly used 
measure to distinguish habitual responses, which are not sensitive to value changes, from goal-
directed ones, which will change depending on the value of the outcome. Rats that were not 
stressed modified their response rate after the devaluation manipulation to reflect the devaluated 
reward outcome. By contrast, chronically stressed rats failed to adjust their responses in light of 
the devaluation, consistent with responses being habitual. Stressed rats also showed neuronal 
atrophy of the medial PFC and associative (dorsal medial) striatum coupled with hypertrophy of 
sensorimotor (dorsal lateral) striatum. These results suggest that stress may influence decision 
making by both impairing PFC function and enhancing habit related circuits.  
In summary, stress, even if unrelated to the decision, can impact decision-making. Based on 
the evidence reviewed, stress appears to bias decision-making towards more habitual responding 
over goal-directed, perhaps through its influence over prefrontal cortex, striatum and/or the 
dopaminergic system. However, the evidence in human is still scares, and further research will be 
needed to confirm this.  
5.2.4.2. Decision-related affect    
Beyond incidental factors, choice options themselves may elicit emotional reactions, which 
in turn may influence decision processes (Lempert & Phelps, 2014). One way that this has been 
studied in the laboratory is by correlating emotional physiological changes (e.g. skin conductance 
response, SCR) and choices. The SCR is an objective, transient indicatior of autonomic nervous 
system arousal in response to a stimulus and it is a common measure of emotional arousal. 
One of the first studies to measure SCR during decision-making was Bechara and 
colleagues (1997, 1999) using a risky decision-making paradigm called Iowa gambling task (IGT). 
In this task, participants are presented with four decks of cards: two that give small gains and 
losses (safe decks) and two that give larger gains but occasionally large losses (risky decks). They 




possible. Over time, healthy participants began to show anticipatory SCR before selecting from the 
risky deck and shortly after they began to preferentially choose the safe over the risky deck. By 
contrast, patients with OFC damaged, neither generated these anticipatory responses nor did they 
avoid the risky deck. Based on these findings, Bechara, Damásio and colleagues put forward the 
somatic marker hypothesis (Damasio, 1994) suggesting that the anticipatory arousal response is a 
bodily signal of the value of the choice and that this signal serves to guide participants away from 
risky choices. Since OFC patients cannot generate these emotional responses, Bechara 
hypothesized that they also could not change their choices.  
Over the years several studies have challenged some of the assumptions in this hypothesis 
(Maia & McClelland, 2004, Fellows & Farah, 2005). Nevertheless, this study remains one of the 
first to link emotional response and brain systems to behavioural choice patters and has been 
crucial in pushing forward the study of emotions in the context of decision-making.   
Other studies have looked at how emotional arousal to losses and gains is linked to choice. 
Sokol-Hessner et al. (2009) tested participants in a gambling task in which they had to choose 
between a certain outcome and a gamble with 50/50 changes of winning or losing money. With 
this design, they were able to quantify loss aversion and risk sensitivity independently for each 
subject. They found that higher SCRs to losses versus gains were linked to greater loss aversion, 
but did not find a relationship between arousal and risk. Follow up studies showed that greater 
amygdala response to monetary losses (relative to gains) also correlated with loss aversion. These 
results are consistent with another study that demonstrated that patient with amygdala damage 
were less loss-averse overall compared to healthy controls (DeMartino et al. 2010). This series of 
studies offer strong evidence that the amygdala is important in mediating aversion to losses but is 
not linked to risk tendencies, showing that neural mechanisms can help dissociate different 
psychological constructs. Using other decision tasks, e.g. pay-to-play games similar to slot 
machines, other studies have shown that emotional responses, including pleasantness ratings, SCR 
and cardiovascular measures, to wins and near misses are good predictors of gambling propensity 
(Lole et al., 2011, Clark et al., 2012).  
In summary, these studies show that autonomic measures of arousal correlate with different 
components of decision tasks and that different brain regions linked to arousal (ventromedial PFC, 
insula, amygdala) may mediate this relationship.  
5.2.4.3. Emotion regulation strategies    
Our emotional reactions are determined in part by how we interpret a particular situation or 
event (Scherer, 2005, Phelps et al., 2014). The ability of shifting emotions by actively changing 
one’s interpretation of an event is known as reappraisal and can be taught. In a typical reappraisal 
experiment, the participant is asked to think about the stimulus in a different way in order to 




Research on cognitive regulation has shown that reappraisal can alter both arousal measures 
and choices. In Sokol-Hessner et al. (2009) participants were instructed to reappraise the 
significance of the choice they were considering by thinking of it as only one in many or to “think 
like a trader” building a portfolio. The use of this strategy led to a reduction in skin conductance 
response and this reduction correlated with diminished loss aversion. Interestingly, it had no effect 
on risk sensitivity (Sokol-Hessner et al., 2009). In a different study, involving intertemporal 
choice, reframing the interpretation of a future reward resulted in more patience (Benoit et al., 
2011).   
Cognitive regulation techniques are powerful tools that can be quickly acquired, but they 
require active effort and practice. With further practice, these may become more automatic and 
less deliberate. As suggested by Phelps et al. (2014), this may be why novice stock traders have 
been reported to show more physiological arousal to volatility in the stock market, a result 
attributed to loss aversion, when compared to more senior traders, who show less arousal and 
better choices (Lo & Repin, 2002).  
The studies described above provides not only a strategy for shaping choice but also strong 
evidence for the role of emotions in decision-making, demonstranting that by changing emotions, 
one can also change choice. 
5.2.4.4. Summary and implications for financial reporting 
Decision-making arises from a collection of complex processes that are influenced by a 
variety of factors including emotional ones.  The research reviewed in this section adds to a large 
stream of evidence suggesting that contrary to the traditional idea that emotions and reason are 
competing forces (e.g. Cohen, 2005), emotions are an intrinsic part of adaptive decision-making. 
As we have just seen, emotion can influence cognition (e.g. value estimations); and cognition (e.g. 
reappraisal) in turn can influence emotional reactions. Furthermore, contrary to a dual-system view 
(emotion vs. cognition), there is no evidence for a clear separation of brain areas involved in 
cognition versus emotion and no evidence for a unitary “emotional” system (Lempert & Phelps, 
2014, Phelps et al., 2014). Based on this, various neuroscientists have proposed the replacement of 
the dual-system view with a more complex, but more realistic, framework in which emotions 
modulate, rather than compete with, cognitive function, through multiple neural circuits.  
Financial decision-making involves among other things, balancing a variety of emotional 
aspects, estimating risk and computing value signals (Bossaerts, 2009). In previous section, we 
explored the role of emotional cues in shaping attention and information sampling. The research 
reviewed in this section shows that emotional reactions elicited by choice options themselves, as 
well as incidental states such as stress, can directly influence choice. Thus highlighting the 
importance of considering emotional factors when studying financial decision-making. 
Furthermore, to the extent that emotions affect choice, we should be able to change choice by 




reappraisal to shape choice. Future work should expand this research to financial accounting 
contexts. This will provide not only better understanding and predictive power in financial 
accounting settings, but also help researchers and regulators devise strategies that help people 
process information as efficiently as possible. 
6. SYNTHESIS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Economics has traditionally studied decision making by asking what people “ought to do”. 
While this has been a fruitful approach, research has now robustly shown that decision makers 
systematically deviate from these normative standards. A rich and complete understanding of 
humans actually decide will require the integration of insights and tools from multiple disciplines 
including economics, psychology, computer science and neuroscience.  
6.1. Towards a multidisciplinary approach  
Behavioural accounting researchers have begun to show interest in applying a 
multidisciplinary approach to the study of accounting problems. From that interest a new subfield 
has emerged, called neuroaccounting. Although there is work emerging, this is still a very young 
field. Having good quality data and interpretation will require further cross talk between fields. 
Although integration is the goal, the fast advances in both ideas and methodology in the different 
fields require specialization, thus high quality multidisciplinary work will depend on bringing 
different researchers with specialized or integrative training together in the pursuit of the same 
question. Physical proximity can ease this integration. The “Institute for the Interdisciplinary 
Study of Decision Making” at New York University has been a pioneer and successful case of this 
belief. It will also depend on making information available between the fields, attracting interest 
from the different researchers and funding agencies and building a common lexicon that can 
support an efficient interaction. Interdisciplinary reviews such as this one, meetings and other 
encounters can help on this. 
In this paper, besides reviewing the various approaches and techniques that have been used 
to study decision making and look at work emerging in the young field of neuroaccounting, we 
aimed to encourage the application of this interdisciplinary approach focusing on a particular 
question of interest: the importance of presentation variables in financial accounting reporting. We 
believe that attracting interest from the various parts including funding will depend on spelling out 
how the different parts can contribute to answering specific problems, what can be achieving and 
importantly, also what currently cannot. The gaps between fields and lack of interaction can also 
lead to unrealistic expectation and over interpretation of what, for example, certain neuroscientific 
tools alone can give us, i.e. over interpreting functional MRI data, that in the long run will lead to 
disappointment rather than fruitful work and will repel rather than attract future researchers. 
Exploiting the potential of this interdisciplinary will depend on a clear understanding of the 




designs and justified conclusions. Importantly, no technique is enough on its own, knowledge will 
come from the convergence of evidence from different techniques and different paradigms.  
6.2. The role of information format – current findings and future directions   
As reviewed in section 5 there is mounting evidence for a role of presentation both from the 
field of psychology and more recently from behavioural accounting itself. This research shows 
that variables such as the order in which information is presented, where it is located, among other 
factors can have a profound impact on evaluation and choice. One of the reasons that has led to 
resistance in taking up this idea is the belief by some, and following efficient market theories, that 
individual biases reflect idiosyncratic behaviour and are thus not relevant for market level 
phenomena. However, research in the behavioural subfields of economics, finance and accounting 
has accumulated evidence that many of these deviations from normative standards are not random 
but systematic and seem to reflect regularities in the way we process information and decide. 
In this review, we aimed to bring together findings and methodologies from behavioural, 
different disciplines that may be pertinent to answer this question and foster future collaborative 
work.  From this research review, emerge the following ideas: 
• Contrarily to our common belief, at any moment, we can pay attention to only a small part of 
what is in our visual field; 
• What aspects of the display get our attention will be determine by a variety of factors, many of 
which are automatic and beyond our goal-directed control. This automatic capture of attention 
may be adaptive in many situations (e.g. quickly detect threat) but can also bias our attention 
away from goals (e.g. prioritizing preferred over accurate information); 
• The effect of attention can be studied by measuring how long people take to search for or 
orient toward a target stimulus after having been cued in diferent ways to a locations;  
• The power of emotional influence can also be studied using subliminal paradigms, i.e. visual 
background masking, and measure speed of response or psychophysiological measures i.e. 
skin conductance, upon subsequent stimuli; 
• How much processing attended and non-attended inputs will get will depend on factors such 
as how difficult is to process the target information, how many distractors are present and 
whether the subject is performing concurrent cognitive demanding tasks; 
• These findings highlight the important of considering the level and type of load involved in 
any financial report. It means that efficient processing and prioritization of relevant 
information will depend on the characteristics of the report including how much information is 
presented, its order, etc. Unfortunately we still know relatively little on exactly what these 
variables are. Future work will need to further characterize the relevant features of the 
information and extend this to financial accounting contexts; 
• Computational requirements are an important factor in how decision makers approach a 




keep computational demands as low as possible or at least at a similar level between 
companies that are being compared. More research is needed to clarify what other factors 
increase computational requirements; 
• Moving from saying that people are “irrational” to actually understand their choices will 
require understanding how the brain breaks down problems, represents different variables and 
selects courses of action. Research into neural coding of decision variables i.e. value has been 
fruitful and shown that many behavioural effects, i.e. reference dependent valuation, that 
according to economic theory are abnormal, make sense if we look at how neurons actually 
represent these variables and the biological constraints they face; 
• Accounting information is not processed in a vacuum. Understanding decision-making as well 
as better predicting its outcomes will depend on understanding the different variables that 
modulate decision processes. Both the emotional reactions elicited by the decision problem 
(e.g. losses) and other emotional states unrelated to the decision at hand (e.g. stress) can have 
powerful influences on decision-making. However, they are not all beyond our control – 
emotional regulations techniques are effective in modulating at least part of these influences.  
• Rather than viewing the relationship between “emotion” and “cognition” as two competing 
forces, affective neuroscientists suggest a modulatory view, whereby emotions modulate in 
different ways, and via different circuitry, cognitive functions.  
6.3. From simple tasks to financial relevant contexts   
We are still far from fully understanding how people sample, process and use financial 
information, but the evidence from more simple stimuli and tasks can provide a foundation for 
hypothesis to be tests and methods to be used in more complex, financial relevant, contexts. 
In moving from simpler to complex, especially when trying to understand neural 
mechanisms, it is important to emphasize that although indeed neural data will help refine our 
behavioural theories, it is also true that understanding neural mechanisms of decision making, or 
indeed any behaviour, will crucially depend on having appropriate behavioural paradigms, that on 
one hand capture the cognitive process of interest and on the other, are adequate to the constraints, 
e.g. temporal, of the technique being used (LeDoux, 2015,  Milner & White, 1987).   
Without an understanding of the kind of processes and computations engaged in a particular 
task or decision problem, it is hard to interpret the neural data or the effects of our manipulations. 
We are left with a crude conclusion (e.g. area x is necessary for task y, which “I am not sure what 
entails”) and difficulty in generalizing to other decision contexts. Here is where psychological 
theory and computational models are instrumental. Computational models can help identify the 
kinds of signals and signals dynamics that are required by different decision problems (Rangel et 
al., 2008). Rather than merely reporting the activation of a brain regions in a given experimental 
condition, researchers now try to identify regions that implement a specific computational process, 




particular computation. This approach allows a more convincing form of inference than in 
traditional fMRI studies.  
One final concern is the validity of laboratory tasks compared to real-world scenarios, not 
only in the physical context but also in the population of study (e.g. the use of university students 
instead of experts). With advances in technology, some of the tools including EEG, 
psychophysical measurements, eye-tracking technology, amount other, are becoming increasingly 
more affordable and portable. And advances in computing are allowing ever more complex 
behavioural tasks. But ultimately, these are limitations of any laboratory–based approach and the 
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Fig. 1. Main division of the human brain. Image retrieved from Nervous System, Servier 
Medical Art by Servier under a Creative Commons Atrribution 3.0 Unported License. 
Fig. 2. Main brain areas referred in the main text. The side view shows the location of the 
dorsolaternal prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), the posterior pariental cortex (PPC) and the insular 
cortex (IC). The midline view, or sagittal section, shows the location of the anterior cingulate 
cortex (ACC), the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), the 
orbitrofrontal cortex (OFC), the thalamus (THAL), the hypothalamus (HYP) and the striatum 
(ST). Dotted lines = deeper in the brain, out of view. Images adapted from Nervous System, 

















Fig. 3. Sagital and coronal views of the human brain showing amygdala and striatal areas 
refered in the main text. Left panel: Localization of the amygdala (AMG), hippocampus (HC) 
and cingulate cortex (CC). Right panel: Subcomponents of the striatum. A coronal section 
illustrating the location of the caudate nucleus (CAU), putamen (PUT), that together make the 
dorsal striatum, and nulcues accumbens (NA) which is part of the ventral striatum. Images 
adapted from Nervous System, Servier Medical Art by Servier under a Creative Commons 
Atrribution 3.0 Unported License. 
 
